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Introduction 
 
Rapid developments in computing and communication technology have made broadband Internet service 
over the wireless phone networks possible. This so-called 3G (third generation) mobile services promise 
to usher us into an era of a seamless marriage between Internet data and mobile phone services. However, 
despite the much-hyped fanfare in the media, the actual diffusion of 3G services has been much slow and 
disappointing in most countries. South Korea has been one of one of few countries that have experienced 
rapid development and diffusion of 3G and the less-advanced 2.5G (two and half generation) mobile 
services. Given the rapid and ubiquitous penetration into everyday use in Korea, broadband mobile 
services in Korea offers an unique opportunity for us to examine how complex technology gets accepted 
in a larger scale.  
 
In this study, we seek (a) to offer theoretical explanations for the pattern of diffusion of broadband mobile 
services in Korea and (b) to gain new theoretical insights on the diffusion of innovation of complex 
technology systems. In particular, we are interested in the role of standards and their impact on the 
diffusion of complex technology systems innovations. We use Anctor network Theory (ANT) as a 
theoretical lens to investigate the complex evolution of the broadband mobile services in Korea.  
 
Theoretical background 
Diffusion of Innovation 
 
According to Rogers (1995), diffusion of innovation can be defined as the process “by which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of the social 
systems.” Typically, a sequential stage model consisting of adoption and implementation phases is 
assumed (Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Fichman & Kemerer, 1997). The past research has sought to explain 
diffusion of innovation based on the adopter characteristics, the social network in which the adopters 
belong to, the communication process, the characteristics of the promoters, and the attributes of the 
innovation itself including triability, relative advantage, compatibility, observability, and complexity 
(Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989; Fichman & Kemerer, 1997; Zmud, 1984). At 
a more macro-level, other scholars sought to explain diffusion of innovation at an industry level by 
looking at the characteristics of innovative firms (Dosi, 1988), absorptive capacity of individual 
companies (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), or the process by dominant designs emerge (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990). 
 
Although the traditional diffusion of innovation theory has provided many useful insights to understand 
the adoption and diffusion of technologies in the past, recent work in the diffusion of complex technology 
point out its limitations (Faraj, Kwon, & Sussman, forthcoming; Lyytinen & Damsgaard, 2001; Tuomi, 
2002). In particular, traditional diffusion of innovation studies treat innovation as distinct and measurable 
features (Rogers, 1995). Thus, the innovations are often characterized as unproblematic, complete, 
unambiguous objects that needs to be “diffused” as they are in a linear temporal sequence.  
 
However, complex technologies such as broadband mobile computing service are ambiguous, 
problematic, messy, and malleable. Such complex technologies have interpretive flexibility (Bijker, 1995; 
Orlikowski, 1992). As such, actors who belong to different communities construct different meanings of 
the innovation. Therefore, these technologies are socially constructed, and simultaneously, community 
shaping (Hughes, 1987).  
 
Therefore, the study of innovation and diffusion of complex technological systems like broadband mobile 
computing services must cross several realms of scientific, public and economic activities ranging from 
observations of ideas, theories and laboratories, industrial policy and regulation, to explorations of 
marketing strategies and changes in consumer behavior. Most of these features are addressed separately 
and in isolation by lines of research. Though each issues mentioned above is useful in understanding a 
specific phase or aspect in the innovation and diffusion process, each one alone is inadequate to account 
for the dynamic evolution of complex technical systems. 
 
Research Framework 
 
Drawing on a framework suggested by Lyytinen and King (2002), we conceptualize the diffusion of 
complex technology systems innovations as dynamic interplay among actors in three different realms: 
innovation system, regulatory regime, and market place. Our research theoretical framework is based on 
the following premises. First, the evolution of broadband mobile computing service systems is critically 
dependent upon the specification and implementation of standards (Funk, 2001; Funk & Methe, 2001; 
Haug, 2002; Lehenkari & Miettinen, 2002). By standard we mean any written artifact, which enables 
effective coordination of activities between independent users of telecommunication technologies 
including manufacturers and service providers. There are three ways that standards set in: de facto 
standards set by markets (often proprietary) as in U.S., voluntary industry agreements, and de jure 
standard mandated like GSM (Global Systems for Mobile communications) in Europe and CDMA (Code 
Division Multi Access) in Korea and the US by National Standard Bodies (NSB) like government and 
ITU (Gandal, Salant & Waverman, 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Research Framework 
 
Second, according to ANT, in order to faithfully understand the development of new technology, one 
needs to examine interrelationships among actors, institutions, the environments, and artifacts which form 
actor networks. Thus, we argue that in order to provide a faithful and explanatory account regarding why 
and how the broadband mobile computing services have evolve like they have, we must analyze dynamic 
and critical relationships among actors in three realms. These are the innovation system, the regulatory 
regime, and the market place. These three realms of activity and their dynamic interactions establish an 
entity what we shall call an innovation and diffusion system. 
 
By an innovation system we mean the interlinked network of sites, competencies, ideas and resources, 
which is capable over time to develop novel technologies and solutions based on research, 
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experimentation and development activity. The process generated by the innovation system is called here 
an innovation cycle (due to the continuous and path dependent nature of the activity). By a regulatory 
regime we mean any type of authority (industrial, national, international), which can influence, direct, 
limit or prohibit any activity in any other systems in the innovation and diffusion system including the 
regulatory regime itself. This right is normally endowed through the concept of statehood and public 
control over economic or other types of activity. The process generated by the regulatory regime is called 
regulatory cycle, which normally results in some form of decision. A regulatory cycle includes regulatory 
intervention like licensing and frequency allocation and regulatory monitoring like pricing and quality 
assurance. Changes in regulatory regime can have fundamental impact on other regimes through measures 
like market liberalization and licensing. By market place we mean a set of actors that produce some 
telecommunication services or technologies (within a value chain) exploiting the technological potential 
defined within a telecommunication standard. These services and the interactions follow in most cases 
principles of economic exchange and involve exchange of goods and services between independent actors 
against tokens of exchange. The process generated within the market place is called a diffusion cycle 
which covers the willingness and propensity of the actors to adopt and utilize services and technologies 
enabled by the wireless standard.  The concept of market place includes changes in customer behavior, 
introduction of new services, and sources and means of possible competition for different market 
segments due to the transfer and channeling of innovation in the market place.  
 
Furthermore, we assume that each one of these systems is in a constant flux and continually interacts 
dynamically with the two others either through feed-forward (e.g. market and service anticipation in the 
innovation system), or feedback loops (exploitation of market experiences). Therefore, the framework 
must help in analyzing the relationships between such behaviors like: innovation and standardization, 
regulation and standardization, or diffusion and standardization.  
 
Finally, we posit that these relationships are mediated through standards as boundary objects. Boundary 
objects are media through which different groups of actors connect.  According to Star and Griesemer 
(1989), boundary objects are “both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several 
parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites” (p. 393). 
Plasticity, or malleability, is particularly important if knowledge needs to be created through the 
interactions between different communities of practice (Henderson, 1991). Many of the existing accounts 
of innovation and diffusion literature do not adequately analyze the critical relationships between such 
behaviors – this in particular applies to relationships between innovation and standardization, and 
diffusion and standardization. According to ANT, inscribing and translating are two main processes by 
which actors and artifacts are interconnected and mobilized to transform actor networks.  Inscription 
refers to the way technical artifacts embody patterns of use.  Translations refers to a variety of ways by 
which actors seek to persuade others and enroll them into an irreversible alignment with a existing or 
prospective network. Thus, success and failure of innovation diffusion can be understood in terms of the 
emergence (or lack thereof) of such transformation of actor network. 
 
These interactions and critical “episodes” of making the innovation traverse through alternative conduits 
in the system of three interacting elements is in our opinion a key to understanding how complex wireless 
services and associated standards are built and evolve. This approach assumes innovation and diffusion of 
complex technology system is non-linear, problematic, and uncertain process that has been neglected in 
previous studies in the innovation literature.  Furthermore, this perspective helps us to see innovation and 
diffusion as intertwined on-going technical and social negotiation processes in actor networks, thus helps 
us overcome a simple linear evolutionary perspective that is often depicted in the literature. We, therefore, 
propose that for a broadband mobile computing service to become widely accepted in the marketplace, it 
must meet the following criteria: 
 
1) It must embody a set of standards which enable the integration and manufacturing of 
complex wireless technologies and other peripheral technologies which at the same time 
embody advances in the activities of the innovation system: 
2) It must overcome major barriers and “critical episodes” in all three realms of the 
innovative systems (key technological challenges), the regulatory regime (obtaining rights 
and political will to operate, license and regulate such services), and the market place 
(introducing successfully new service concepts, pricing, customer service and competitive 
differentiation). Thus, the failure of the evolution of broadband mobile computing services 
may occur due to failures in the innovation system (failure to develop a standard), failures 
in the regulatory system (failure to recognize the standard, or the service implied by it, 
failure to enforce the standard), or failures in the market place (failure to make users adopt 
the standard or services based on the standard): and, 
 
In the world of broadband mobile services, South Korea represents as an interesting case because Korea 
was a latecomer in the global competition of digital mobile services in the late 1980’s which was 
dominated by European and the US companies.  Despite this late start, Korea has emerged as one of the 
leading countries of broadband mobile services in early 2000’s.  In order to understand this rapid pace of 
innovation and diffusion of broadband mobile services in Korea, we conducted an in-depth field study.  
 
Research Methodology 
 
Our field study involved 22 in-depth interviews with key actors in all three realms and extensive archival 
research. We sought to analyze the roles of and relationships among actors (a) during the early stage of 
digital mobile services development (early 1990’s) and (b) during the early stage of 3G diffusion in early 
2000’s.  The interviewees include three major mobile phone operators (SK Telecom, KT Freetel, LG 
Telecom), manufacturers of both handset and network equipment (Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics), 
leading telephone company (Korea Telecom), ETRI (Electronics and Telecommunications Research 
Institute), the Ministry of Information and Communication (MoIC), and content & solution provider 
(Witcom), and middleware provider (FEELink). Most interviews were conducted in face-to-face which 
were audio taped, except the interview with MoIC which was conducted via e-mail. 
 
In addition to interview data, we analyzed to archival data related to CDMA developments in Korea from 
various sources including white papers, technical reports, news magazines, and congress hearing 
transcripts. This archival data analysis provide important information regarding the development of 
broadband mobile services in Korea, but also offer important insights regarding the roles of periphery 
innovations in Korea including Internet, digital entertainment industry, landline telephony, personal 
computers, and other mobile technologies such as wireless local area network. Following the actor-
network approach (Latour, 1987), we began with the known actors (operators and ETRI), then expanded 
our interview list as we followed the actors in the network. The focus of our interview was examining the 
actors’ role in the development broadband mobile services in Korea and their relationship with others.  
We also asked their role in the establishment of various standards for broadband mobile services. Through 
this, we attempted to gain an understanding the dynamic and reciprocal pattern of interrelationship among 
actors over time as broadband mobile services in Korean gained its momentum in the market place. 
 
Results 
 
We present our results in three sections.  The first section provides a historical overview of the evolution 
of Korean mobile phone service market. The second and the third section provides a more detailed and 
rich description of the actors’ role and their relationship for 2G and 3G (and 2.5G), respectivey. 
 
Korean Mobile Phone Industry 
 
Mobile phone services were first introduced in Korea in 1984 by Korea Mobiele Telcomm (KMT), a 
spin-off of KT. KMT enjoyed its government monopoly during the entire 1G (first generation) era utile it 
was acquired by SK Telecom (SKT) in 1994. During that period, all the network equipments were 
imported from AT&T and Motorola.  In late 80’s, Korea government selected mobile telecommunication 
as one of the nation’s key strategic industries for future export began looking for ways in which they can 
develop internal capabilities.   
 
After facing stiff resistance from countries who own intellectual properties on GSM for the 2G, Korean 
government, research institutions, and private companies began working with QUALCOMM to 
commercialize CDMA. Unlike European GSM standard that improves spectrum capacity by dividing 
each frequency channel into time slots each of which is allocated to each user (TDMA: Time Division 
Multiple Access), CDMA allows multiple accesses by assigning each user a pseudo-random code, which 
differentiates each call simultaneously carried over the same spectrum. After the Korean government 
announced that CDMA would be the only standard for 2G mobile services in Korea, SKT launched the 
world first commercial CDMA service in January 1996. Since then, Korean CDMA market saw 
unprecedented rapid growth. During the same time, Korean firms and research institutions also rapidly 
gain technical competencies in manufacturing and design of new handsets and network devices and 
became a significant player in the global mobile phone market.   
 
While the Korean government adopted a single-standard policy for the 2G services, it chose to adopt 
multi-standard policy for the next generation 3G services. There are two different standards for the 3G 
services. CDMA2000 is a continuation of QualComm’s 2G CDMA technology. It is known as 
synchronous mode because the communication between handset and base stations are synchronized based 
on the same time zone, set by the global position systems (GPS) satellites. On the other hand, wCDMA 
(wideband CDMA) is an European standard that does not require GPS satellites by the US government. In 
this standard, each bas station needs to have its own code and promises a global roaming which has been 
the trademark of GSM standard.  The Korean government awarded wCDMA licenses to SKT and KT 
FreeTel (KTF) in July 2000, and in August 2001, a CDMA2000 license was awarded to LG Telecomm 
(LGT).  Table 1 summarizes the evolution of wireless service operators in Korea and Table 2 shows their 
relative market shares. As the table shows, SKT has been a leading service operator in the CDMA 
domain. 
 
Table 1. Evolution of Wireless Service Operators in Korea 
 
 1G IS-95a CDMA IS-95b CDMA CDMA 2000 1x CDMA 2000 1x 
EVDO 
SKT July, 1988 January, 1996 
(World first) 
August, 1997 
(World first) 
October, 2000 
(World first) 
November, 2002 
KTF April, 1984 October, 1997 July, 1999 May, 2001 May, 2002 (World 
first) 
LGT N.A. October, 1997  May, 2001 N.A. 
 
Table 2. Market share of operators (in terms of the number of registers) 
 
2002  2001 2000 1999 
SKT 53.2% SKT 40.9% SKT 40.8% SKT 43.1% 
KTF 31.9% KTF 33.0% KTF 19.7% KTF 18.2% 
LGT 14.8% LGT 14.7% LGT 14.7% Shinsegi 13.8% 
  Shinsegi 11.4% Shinsegi 13.1% LGT 13.2% 
    KTM.com 11.7% KTM.com 11.7% 
KTF acquired KTM.com in 2001 and SKT acquired Shinsegi in 2002. 
 
 
2G Era (1989 – October 2000) 
 
This era can be characterized with a close collaboration among government, research laboratories (both 
private and government-funded), and operators in commercializing CDMA which was still in its 
conceptual stage.   Figure 2 shows the actors and their relationship during this era. 
 
Figure 2. Actor Network of 2G Era 
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Technology Regime 
 
CDMA began to be developed since 1989. The first phase was launched in 1989 (through 1992) under the 
supervision of ETRI with the total amount of 4.5 billion won and 63 researchers. The second phase 
proceeded through 1990-1996 with the budget of 44.1 billion won and 608 researchers. Qualcomm was 
invited to join the project in 1990 with its own investment of USD 16.95 million). Between 1990-1995, 
four other companies joined the project as DM (Designated Manufacturers): Samsung Electronics, LG IC 
(later changed to LG Electronics), Hyundai Electronics, and Maxon. The first three companies each 
invested US$ 8.5 million for developing infrastructure and terminals in this project (also promised 6.0% 
and 6.5% royalties to Qualcomm for domestic and foreign sales, respectively). Meanwhile, Maxon 
invested US$3 million (with the promise of 5.25% and 5.75% royalties to Qualcomm for domestic and 
foreign sales, respectively) to focus only on terminal. Meanwhile, the foreign manufacturers did not 
participate in this consortium because they focused on the GSM market.  
 
In all phases, KT played a significant leading role since KT had experience of managing large scale 
development and commercialization telecommunication technologies in the past.  KT dispatched its 
researchers to ETRI, and managed the project at ETRI related to CDMA development. It was also 
involved in the system architecture design and the dealing with Qualcomm for the contracts.  
 
Qualcomm developed the core technology for CDMA standard. By late 80’s they already had 53 patents 
on radio air protocol and MSM (mobile station modem). On the other hand, ETRI, and its domestic 
partners, brought their experiences of developing domestic TDX exchange systems during mid 80’s.   
They focused on modifying existing TDX architecture in order to deploy CDMA network in a large scale.  
Figure 3 shows the simplified representation of the architecture of CDMA network and the roles of 
Qualcomm and ETRI. The resultant standards are known as a family of IS-95 CDMA standards, or also 
known as cdmaOne.   
 
Figure 3. CDMA Wireless Network Architecture and its development 
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Operators, in particular SKT, also played significant roles in the development process. SKT organized a 
special taskforce for CDMA in order to conduct various field tests that provided critical feedback to the 
commercialization processes.  Samsung Electronic developed a tight relationship with SKT by offering its 
latest handset models only to SKT.  
 
Regulatory Regime 
 
Korean government played significant roles in the early stage of CDMA development in several different 
ways.  First, the Korean’ government shaped the Korean telecommunication industry through its strong 
industrial policy. By the end of the 1970’s, telecommunication services in Korea had been strictly 
controlled by the Korean government for national security due to the ideological and political standoff 
with North Korea.  However, by the late 1980’s, the South Korean government officials began to 
recognize the potential of telecommunication technology as a means of economic value creation (Kim, 
2003a). This is reflected in the transformation of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, which 
used to regulate postal and telephone service, into the Ministry of Information and Communication in 
1994 (Chang, 2003).  Government, thus, significantly invested to modernize telecommunication 
infrastructure by spending an annual average of 1 trillion won between 1982 and 1986. The government 
has already set up ETRI, a research institute in 1976. Through the government funding, ETRI developed 
TDX technologies and licensed them to all major domestic telecommunication equipment manufacturers. 
As noted earlier, this capability of TDX domestication was proven to be critical in the development of 
CDMA technologies.  Furthermore, the TDX infrastructure paved a way of more advanced digital data 
network infrastructure. In January 1989, the Korean Government chose the digital mobile communication 
as one of the national industrial project priorities.  
 
A second, and perhaps most controversial policy decision, was the Korean government’s decision to 
adopt CDMA over European GSM standard in November 1993.  Since GSM was adopted by European 
countries in 1987 as a standard and it offers a global roaming capability, some operators and 
manufactures in Korea preferred GSM (Song, 1999). However, the government pushed the adoption of 
GSM for the apparent possibility of large call volume that CDMA can handle and the Qualcomm’s 
willingness to share technology with Korean firms.  On the other hand, by the late 1980’s, the GSM 
community was established and had little incentive to share intellectual property with an outsider who did 
not have its own to share with the existing members. This became an important incentive for Korean 
government to pursue an alternative technology for 2G mobile services. The decision to standardize with 
CDMA helped Korean operators and manufactures avoid problems that the U.S. firms faced with multiple 
standards (Chang, 2003; Funk, 2002).  
 
Third, the Korean government provided an important role in the development and commercialization of 
CDMA technologies by working closely with industry partners. Government set up a research fund for 
CDMA technology from the license fee collected from the five operators based on the market share. The 
fund was managed by IITA (Institute of Information Technology Assessment) whose board consists of 
executives from operators, except one member. The government played a key role by arranging the 
collaboration between SKT, ETRI, KT, and manufacturers from the beginning so that the time lag 
between the technology development and commercialization can be minimized.  The government also 
encouraged the synergy between operators and manufacturers by allowing a scheme called Vental 
(vendor and telecom operators) in which operators are allowed to run own business units for equipment 
manufacturing. Such a partnership has been proven to be very important in telecommunication industry 
(Steinbock, 2003)  
 
Finally, the Korean government introduced deregulation of communication services, particularly in 
wireless phone and broadband internet services.  As noted earlier, in 1991, the KMT was privatized and 
later became SKT. In 1996, had an auction for the four additional operators. As a result of introducing 
five operators in a relatively small and new market, the government set the stage of fierce competition in 
the market place as noted below. 
 
Market 
 
There were five operators chosen by the Korean government for the 2G services. Three operators were 
selected for PCS services (KTF, LGT, Hansol) and two operators for cellular services (SKT and 
Shinsegi). In January of 1996, SKT successfully launched the world first commercial CDMA services. 
The second operator (Shinsegi Telecom) began offering commercial service in April 1996.  Within seven 
months, they reached 100,000 subscribers and within a year a half million.  Three more operators (KTF, 
LGT, and Hansol) provide PCS service began offering their services in October 1997. All operators added 
data service function in the late 1998 (14.4kbps), and upgraded the network to IS-95b CDMA in 1999 
(64kbps).  
 
The relatively small market size and the large number of operators created fierce competition among 
them. The competition, however, facilitated the rapid market penetration of CDMA services through the 
price competition. For example, all the operators aimed at the first mover advantage, and subsidized the 
consumers with the almost full cost of handset purchase.  
 
During this period, the killer contents were short-messaging services (SMS), VSM, and Caller ID. Unlike 
foreign operators, Korean operators collaborated in developing content services in order to expand the 
market size. Typically, when a new content provide comes up with a new data service idea, the operators 
had exclusive rights to offer the service for three to six months before the content operators could provide 
similar services through other operators. For example, Catch Call service (that retains the caller-number 
while the receiver-phone is off) was first launched with KTF. However, it soon became available to other 
operators. The key reason behind this is that non-interoperable services across operators were not popular 
among subscribers. The explosion of SMS services which dated back when three operators interoperated 
their SMS services in 1998 is another example of the importance of interoperability. 
 
 
 
2.5G and 3G Era (October 2000 --) 
 
SKT opened the era of broadband mobile services in the form of 2.5G services in October 2000 by began 
to use CDMA 2000 1x for the first time in the world1. Soon, KTF and LGT followed the suit by offering 
their own 2.5G services in May 2001. As broadband mobile technologies continue to evolve, this era 
shows radically different network of actors.  Figure 4 shows the summary of the relationship among key 
actors during this era. 
 
Figure 4. Actor Network of 2.5G and 3G Era 
 
Tec hno lo g y Re g im e
- M anufact ure rs
- O pe rators
- Value -ad de d
solutio n
R eg ul ator y R eg ime
- G ov er nm ent
- Inter n at ional
standar d iz ati on
com m ittee s
(3GP P, 3G PP2 )
-  D om est ic
standar d iz ati on
com m ittee s
(T TA , K W ISF )
M ar ket
O pe rators , C Ps ,
C onsum ers
S tand ar d
- W -C D M A
- C D M A2 00 0 (1x , E VD O , EV DV )
- W IPI
a
b
 
 
Technology Regime 
 
As the bandwidth of 2G was proven to be insufficient to support high-volume data transmission for the 
multimedia broadband internet services over the mobile phone network, new standards for 3G began to 
emerge. International Mobile Telecommunication-2000 (IMT-2000) is the global standard for 3G wireless 
communications, defined by a set of interdependent ITU (International Telecommunication Union) 
recommendations. Both wCDMA and CDMA2000 are officially included in thi IMT-2000 family. In 
Korea, manufacturers preferred wCDMA because leading European countries chose it.  Since wCDMA is 
incompatible with both GSM and CDMA2000, they predicted that there would be substantial size of new 
markets for both the network and terminal equipments (Gandal, Salant & Waverman, 2003).  
 
During the previous era, Korean manufacturers significantly added their own technical innovation 
capability.  For example, Samsung became the world largest CDMA handset manufacturer and the second 
player in the global market only next to Nokia.  Similarly, LG Electronics also gained substantial footing 
                                                 
1 The world first commercial 3G service was offered by Japanese DoCoMo in the form of FOMA, a variant of 
wCDMA standard in October 2001.  
in the global handset area. Combined, Korean firms occupy over 60% of the global CDMA handset 
market. While they still rely on core technology developed by Qualcomm, they often lead innovations in 
new features, such as multimedia and new display screens, as a result of their tight collaborations with 
domestic operators who constantly try new types of services.  Also important to note is that domestic 
manufactures dominate the domestic market for both handset and network equipments.  For example, in 
1995, Motorola had a dominant position of 52% in Korean handset market. However, by 1999, domestic 
manufacturers took over more than 90% of market share.  Another significant change is that Samsung 
developed its own CDMA 2000 chipset in early 2003. Taken together, Korean firms have shown dramatic 
increase in their innovation capability in CDMA area and increased their influences in the market.  
 
On the other hand, a number of dominant players of 2G have lost their influences. For example,  
KT invested 10.5 billion Korean won in various 3G development projects. KT also acquired the 3G 
business license from the government, and launched KT ICOM for 3G business, which was later acquired 
by KTF. However, KT never played such a significant leading role in this era as it did during the previous 
era.  Foreign manufacturers (Ericsson, Motorola, and Nokia), who did not participated in the development 
and commercialization of 2G CDMA services in Korea, invested for IMT2000 initiatives. However, they 
have not been able to capture any significant portion of the market during this ear.   
 
Two most important actors whose roles were significantly decreased are Qualcomm and ETRI.  While 
Qualcomm was still a dominant player in CDMA2000 domain, a number of its competitors began 
producing compatible chipsets including Samsung as noted above and Nokia, among others. Furthermore, 
Qualcomm was at odd with some of operators in Korea in terms of the evolutionary path of CDMA2000. 
While Qualcomm preferred to follow the evolutionary path of CDMA2000 1x ? CDMA 1x EVDO ? 
CDMA 3x, LGT planed to skipped CDMA 2000 1x EVDO and wants to implement CDMA 2000 1x 
EVDV, which was opposed by Qualcomm. Simiarly, the role ETRI, who played a vital leading role in the 
development and commercialization of 2G CDMA, diminished significantly in this era. It only played a 
supporting role in developing 3G.  
 
A key technology obstacle for the successfully implementation of broadband mobile data service was the 
standard for mobile internet data platform.  In 2G, WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) and iMode were 
two standards.  As service providers and content providers begin to offer more advanced data services, 
three major operators in Korea implemented their own platforms to run various internet-based 
applications on mobile handsets. Table 3 shows the five different platforms that three operators offer. 
 
Table 3. Proprietary Mobile Internet Platforms for Broadband Data Services 
 
Service Providers Mobile Internet Application Platform 
GVM SKT 
SK-VM 
BREW KTF 
MAP 
LGT KVM 
 
However, since these platforms did not offer interoperability across operators, the three major operators, 
TTA (Telecommunications Technology Association) and ETRI developed a standard for mobile internet 
called WIPI (Wireless Internet Platform for Interoperability). This was adopted as a part of wCDMA 
standards by 3GPP (the 3rd Generation Partnership Project), which is an international forum to establish 
wCDMA standards in may 2002. This is another significant sign that Qualcomm’s influence was 
diminished given that Qualcomm was promoting its own BREW (Binary Run-time Environment for 
Wireless).  Also, the prominent role that TTA, which is an association of private sector companies, in the 
development of WIPI was an evidence of the shift of the center of the technology innovation activities 
from Government-led research initiatives to private sector in Korean mobile service industry.   
 
An important group of actors that emerged in this era is the value-added solution providers for various 
form of multi-media contents.  They connected contents providers to mobile operators’ network. While 
operators wanted to maintain exclusive relationship with these solution providers, most of them deals 
with all three operators, which reflects their growing bargaining power in the network.  
 
As the deployment of much-hyped wCDMA was delayed and the cost of multimedia data service through 
3G proved to be too expensive, a group of actors began exploring an alternative broadband mobile 
internet technology called Portable Internet (PI) utilizing 2.3Ghz spectrum. It was primarily pushed by 
landline operators and broadband service providers including KT, Hanaro Telecom, and Dacom as well as 
ETRI. They were collaborating with two U.S. partners – Flarion and ArryComm—who own core 
technologies. It is interesting to note that these are actors who were not active in the 3G actor network. 
 
Regulatory Regime 
 
During the 3G era, the Korean government turned to multiple standard policy, adopting both wCDMA 
and CDMA2000 1x. Govern gave licenses for wCDMA to SKT and KTF, and for CDMA 2000 to LG 
Telecom.  
 
The Korean government’s continuing deregulatory telecommunication policy toward landline 
telecommunications facilitated the rapid penetration of broadband Internet service in Korea. The 
government selected Hanaro Telecom as the second local phone service provider who focused on 
broadband service in order to gain market recognition. KT had to react to this strategic threat by offering 
its own broadband services. The government deregulation policy also encouraged from other industries 
such cable network companies and power utility company offering their own broadband services. 
Consequently, the consumers who were used to high-speed Internet access through landline began to 
expect similar experiences in the mobile Internet domain, which formed an important market factor 
behind the rapid diffusion of 3G services in Korea as we will note below. 
 
An important changes in the regulatory regime is that emergence of the standardization organizations, 
both domestic and international. Domestically, TTA became an important institution for the development 
of IMT-2000 standards. As noted above, TTA played an important role of WIPI along with other 3G-
related standard specifications.  Internationally, 3GPP and 3GPP2 (The 3rd Generational Partnership 
Project 2) were established as official international standardization bodies for wCDMA and CDMA 2000, 
respectively.  TTA represented Korea for both organizations.  This is a significant change in their 
negotiation position compared to the 2G era.  
 
Market 
 
All three operators successfully implemented 2.5G by May 2001 using CDMA 2000 1x. KTF offered 
world first CDMA 2000 1x EVDO service, beginning the era of 3G services in Korea in May 2002, 
followed by SKT in November 2002. While both of them received licenses for wCDMA, they postpone 
the actual deployment due to the uncertain business environments. KTF’s FIMM (First in Multi Media) 
and SKT’s June were their EVDO services.  By the end of May 2003, SKT had 800,000 subscribers for 
June service out of 17 million users, while KTF had about 470,000 out of for FIMM service.  
Furthermore, during the same time period, about 40 per cent of new handsets being sold were camera 
phones (Kim, 2003b). In the first quarter of 2003, SKT made 9 per cent of its revenue from multimedia 
data services though EVDO.  
 
Typical popular applications include: Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), downloading ring-tone and 
animation characters, downloading music and video clips, and location-based service. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Our study suggests that CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) standard played an integral role as 
boundary object that enable the alignment of interests of multiple actors during the early stage of its 
commercialization. During the early stage of CDMA development and commercialization, key actors 
interests were aligned around CDMA standards. Qualcomm, who owned the core technologies needed 
partners to test and commercialize its yet unproven technology.  Korean government needed a partner 
who would transfer key know-how in digital wireless communication technologies. When they faced a 
high entry barrier into GSM camp, CDMA standards emerged as an effective alternative. ETRI and KT 
brought their experiences and expertise in TDX development, complementing Qualcomm’s core 
knowledge in air-radio interface. Korean manufacturers were also eager to acquire new technology and 
expand into new business area through CDMA. Taken together, this shows that CDMA standards became 
an obligatory passage point of an actor network for broadband mobile services in Korea.   
 
In this process, the meaning of innovation of 2G mobile services constantly evolves and transforms, with 
inherent uncertainty and interpretive flexibility among different actors.  This view offers a stark contrast 
to the traditional diffusion of innovation perspective, which often characterizes innovation as an 
unproblematic object that needs to be diffused among users. Instead, innovation is in-making as it 
traverses in the actor network, gaining different interpretations and being transformed as new actors were 
enrolled into the network. The diffusion of CDMA into Korean market was possible as a result of 
enrolment of key actors, through which the innovation itself was transformed. In this regard, diffusion of 
CDMA into Korean market was innovation. Thus, we suggest a duality, instead of dualism, of innovation 
and diffusion.  
 
Second, we also found that standard both enables and constrains innovation. Compared to the European 
standard, GSM, CDMA standard is a weak form of standard that only specifies air radio interface. 
Therefore, it provides much larger room for local innovations and experiments with new service models 
and ideas. Especially after the successful commercial deployment of 2G network, many content providers, 
operators, and middleware solution providers began experimenting with many new service models as later 
versions of CDMA standards began providing enough bandwidth. These experiences in turn provided 
useful information to the operators, who then became important voices in the standardization body (3GPP 
and 3GPP2) for the service level interface specifications. 
 
This offers an interesting perspective regarding the path-dependency. In economics literature, path 
dependency is often used to understand the lock-in effect (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985). In our study, 
however, the path-dependency of operators on CDMA standard enabled them to innovate for new service 
models and technologies in preparing 3G services. Thus, future research on standards and standardization 
needs to study the different path-dependency effects of different types of standards in the innovation 
process. 
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